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ABSTRACT
In Ireland, the trade of milk quota is subject to regional restrictions and a large variation in quota prices
between regions has caused some controversy. This article investigates this issue by analysing the
functioning of the Irish milk quota exchange market. For this purpose, the economic value of milk quota is
estimated using an optimisation framework. The estimated values are then compared to milk quota prices
paid at the exchange market. The analysis reveals that quota is undervalued in the border, midlands and
west and south-west regions, while milk quota is overvalued in the east and south regions. This implies
that farmers in certain regions overpay for additional quota, while other farmers secure good value for
their quota investments. The paper concludes by discussing that the identified regional differences are
only partly explained by economic and production factors.
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1. Introduction
It is well understood and supported by many economic
studies that quotas introduce inefficiency in a sector but
that this inefficiency can be reduced if the quota is
traded freely between producers (e.g. Colman, 2000;
Hennessy et al., 2009). Despite this, few Member States
of the European Union (EU) permit open trade in milk
quotas. Quota trade restrictions come in the form of
regional restrictions, quota price cooling mechanisms,
taxes on transfers and so forth (e.g. Bogetoft et al., 2003;
Colman, 2000). These restrictions are mostly motivated
by social goals but they have economic consequences
that affect the efficiency of the dairy sector, the
functioning of the quota market, the price at which
quota is traded and ultimately farmers’ welfare.
The EU dairy sector has been restricted by milk
quotas since 1984 in order to limit public expenditure on
the dairy sector, to control dairy production, and to
stabilize milk prices and the incomes of dairy farmers
(EC, 2009). The abolition of milk quotas in 2015 was
first stipulated at the Luxembourg Agreement of the
Mid Term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) in 2003, and the abolition of milk quotas has
been confirmed at the subsequent Health Check of the
CAP (EC, 2009). In order to prepare the sector for the
eminent removal of milk quotas, national milk quotas
increase by 1% annually from 2009 to 2013.
The removal of milk quotas is expected to have large
implications on the dairy sector, as for the first time in
over 25 years, dairy farmers will be able to expand milk
production without restrictions. However, still being
subject to quota restrictions, dairy farmers face difficult
decisions whether and when to expand milk production.
Increasing milk production by acquiring additional
quota on the milk quota market is a difficult decision
for dairy farmers, since the economic consequences of
this decision depend on the future profitability of dairy
farming (Hanson, 2009).
In this analysis we study the Irish milk quota market.
The exchange of milk quota in Ireland has been allowed
since the beginning of 2007, but the ring-fencing of
quota in general, and the large variation in milk quota
prices in particular, has been the subject of considerable
controversy in Ireland. Many theories have been
postulated as to why the large variation in quota prices
exist, however there has been no empirical analysis of
this issue to date. On the one hand the economics of
milk production in the various regions may justify the
price differential; however there may also be an element
of farmer behaviour or regional idiosyncrasies at play.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the
functioning of the Irish milk quota trading scheme by
comparing the estimated economic value of milk quota
to actual trade prices observed at the milk quota trading
scheme. The purpose of this analysis is to identify
whether quota is over- or undervalued in certain
regions. The results of this analysis are relevant to
policy makers as they allow suggestions as to where milk
production is likely move after the abolition of quota.
Further, the findings are also of relevance for farmers
wishing to expand milk production. The results can
serve as a decision tool whether to invest in quota or to
wait until quotas are abolished.
Following the introduction, the Irish milk quota
trading scheme is outlined. Next, the details of an
empirical model that is developed to estimate the
economic value of milk quota are presented. In section
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4 the data are described. The subsequent section
presents the results, followed by some final conclusions.
2. Background
In Ireland, the transfer of quota between farmers has
been permitted since the late 1980s but such transfers
were highly regulated and mostly attached to land. In
2007, a new milk quota allocation scheme has been
introduced allowing farmers to make permanent quota
transfers separate from land. The quota allocation
scheme can be divided into three schemes: the milk
quota trading scheme, the temporary leasing scheme
and the reallocation of unused quota. Since the milk
quota trading scheme is the main scheme by which
quota can be allocated to different producers, the focus
of this study is on the milk quota trading scheme.
The milk quota trading scheme is operated on a
biannual basis and takes place at the beginning and in
autumn of each year. Each of the approximately 30
dairy processors (co-operatives) operates a ring-fenced
quota exchange, i.e. quota cannot be moved from one
exchange to another. Farmers give a single-bid, stating
price and quantity that they are willing to sell or to buy.
The equilibrium price at which quota is traded is subject
to some intervention and market cooling mechanism.
For example, 30% of the milk offered for sale is
transferred to a priority pool sold at a fixed price to
successors, new entrants or lost leases. This implies that
the scheme consists of a priority pool and a market
exchange. All offers to buy and to sell are entered into
the exchange and the initial equilibrium price is
calculated as follows: only 70% of the quantity offered
will be considered for the equilibrium price calculation
as 30% of the quantity offered goes directly into the
priority pool. Next, all offers and demands are ordered
on the price quoted. Offers are added up from the lowest
price, while demands are added up the opposite way.
The initial equilibrium price is either the price at which
the quantity offered equals the quantity demanded or, if
that price does not exist, the price with the least
difference between the two quantities where demand
exceeds supply (DAFF, 2011a). After the initial
equilibrium price is calculated, all bids that exceed the
calculated price by 40% or more will be removed and the
price is calculated again without those offers. This is the
final market clearing price at which milk quota is sold.
All offers to sell quota at or below this price will be sold
at the market clearing price and similarly all bids to buy
quota at or above the market clearing price will be
accepted. The remaining offers and bids will be rejected
(DAFF, 2011a). The market clearing prices differ
significantly between the co-operatives, as can be seen
in Figure 1.
Buyers and sellers face certain rules when participat-
ing in the milk quota trading scheme. For example, if all
or parts of the milk quota are sold, the farmer is not
allowed to purchase, lease or receive any milk quota for
a period of three years. Further, the milk allocated to
the priority pool will not be returned to the farmer, even
if the offered quota fails to sell. Buyers are subject to
quantitative restrictions. The maximum quantity that
can be purchased in each milk quota trading scheme is
limited to 100,000 litres since 2010, which increased
from 80,000 litres in 2008.
While the milk quota trading scheme is operated in
advance of the relevant milk quota year, Irish farmers
also have the option to avail quota during the milk
quota year with the temporary leasing scheme.
Producers have the opportunity to lease the part of
their quota which they will not use during the current
milk quota year into their co-operative pool. In turn,
producers who require additional quota can apply to
lease quota from the pool (DAFF, 2011b).
Finally, there is also the possibility to receive quota at
the end of the milk quota year through the reallocation
of unused quota. This scheme is designed for the event
of a production level that exceeds national quota, and
unused quota is then reallocated to eligible over-quota
producers.
3. Empirical Approach
A cross-sectional farm level dataset is used in an
optimisation framework to estimate the economic value
of quota. Hennessy et al. (2009) used Irish National
Farm Survey (NFS) data and FAPRI-Ireland price
projections to estimate the economic value of milk
quota in Ireland. Here a similar methodology is applied
but the model is re-specified to simulate as closely as
possible the conditions of the milk quota trading scheme
as it is operated in Ireland.
The model structure is as follows. The objective
function of an individual farmer, denoted by subscript i,
is expressed as:
Max
Qi
Pi~
XT
t~0
1
(1zri)
t p(Mit){PtQit{C(Qit)½  (1)
where Pi represents the net margin of farmer i, r is a
discount factor, p denotes the gross output from milk
quota (Mit) in period t, Qit denotes the quantity of quota
farmer i decides to purchase or sell in period t, and Pt
and C are the associated price and quantity.4 This
implies that the second component in the square
brackets in equation (1) is the quota investment in
period t which is simply the price of quota in that period
times the quantity of quota purchased and the final
component represents adjustment costs to the farmer.
The farmer chooses a quantity Qit of quota to purchase
(or sell) in each period (year) that maximises a
discounted stream of annual net margins between the
current period t50 and the period when quota is
abolished, t5T. The solution to equation (1) represents
the demand or supply of milk quota by farmer i in each
time period associated with expansion of milk produc-
tion by amount Qit. Adjustment costs include for
example, additional housing, land, labour, etc. In the
case where a farmer sells quota, the cost of quota
includes the margin foregone due to the reduction in
milk production less the net margin gained from
reallocating resources to the best alternative enterprise.
Since it is assumed that milk deliveries Mit are equal
to the farm’s milk quota in period t, then:
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Mit~Mit{1zQit: (2)
Thus milk deliveries in period t are equal to milk
deliveries in period t21 plus quota purchased (or less
quota sold) in period t. Equation (2) therefore defines
the quota constraint that limits the farmer’s optimisa-
tion problem. The Lagrangian for farm i’s maximisation
problem is:
Li~
XT
t~0
1
1zrið Þt
p(Mit){Pt:Qit{C(Qit)½ z
XT
t~0
li t Mit{1zQit{Mitð Þ:
(3)
Here lit represents the marginal value to farmer i
from relaxing the milk quota constraint by one unit - the
shadow price of milk quota - specifying the marginal
effect of an increase in Mit on the value of the farm’s
discounted net margins between t50 and t5T dis-
counted to time 0. The economic value of quota is
derived based on the aggregated effect, as explained in
the following paragraphs.
The constrained optimisation problem defined by
equations (1) and (2) is solved using estimates of farm
level adjustment costs, price and cost projections
coming from the FAPRI-Ireland model (Binfield et al.,
2008) and NFS (Connolly et al., 2007) data for Ireland.
Estimates of the marginal revenue product (economic
value) of milk quota are derived for a sample of dairy
farms for the period up to 2015. In this analysis it is
assumed that the national milk quota remains binding
up to 2015 and therefore the quota produces a profit up
to and including the year 2014. Aggregation of these
results generates an empirical estimate of the aggregate
demand for milk quota, while the distribution of farm
reservation demands against existing holdings of quota
indicates the trades of quota between farms. Within the
model each farmer’s purchase is limited to 80,000 litres
to reflect the constraints imposed on quota purchase in
the 2008 milk quota exchange.5
In this analysis it is assumed that farmers increase
milk production on a phased or incremental basis. They
begin by increasing the dairy specialisation of the farm,
by removing all male animals from the farm and
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Figure 1: Milk Quota Exchange Clearing Prices
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retaining only dairy cows and replacements. This is
considered the low cost stage of expansion. Once this
stage of expansion has been exhausted, farmers will
move beyond their own resource base and rent more
land and acquire additional resources. This is consid-
ered the high cost stage of expansion. The extent to
which farmers can expand at the different stages is
estimated for each farmer in the NFS on the basis of
their livestock numbers and land area. The costs
associated with the two stages of expansion are taken
from Shalloo and Dillon (2006). The full details of costs
associated with each stage of expansion are outlined in
Appendix A. It should be noted that the analysis does
not factor in the possibility of expanding milk produc-
tion by changing the production system, i.e. moving to a
more intensive production system or a higher genetic
merit cow.
The demand and supply price of milk quota is
estimated for each farmer in the NFS. The 2008
economic value is estimated, this estimate is based on
the net margins earned from each unit of quota in every
year from 2009 to 2014 inclusive. Farms are grouped
according to their geographic location and individual
farm demand and supply prices are summed using the
NFS weights to arrive at aggregate supply and demand
curves for milk quota in various regions. The intersec-
tion of regional supply and demand curves are inter-
preted as the economic value of quota.
4. Data
In the analysis of economic value of quota, data on all
manufacturing milk dairy herds in the NFS6 dataset are
used; this consists of 343 farms that are weighted to
represent the national population of 19,600 dairy farms
(Connolly et al., 2007). The NFS collect enterprise
specific variable costs but fixed costs are recorded on a
whole farm basis. For this analysis total costs are
considered, although excluding the cost of owned
resources such as land or family labour. Fixed costs
are allocated to the dairy enterprise on the basis of gross
output share. All technical coefficients, as recorded by
the NFS, are assumed to remain static over the period.
To simulate the milk quota exchange scheme as
closely as possible the sample of dairy farms are
disaggregated by region. While it would be desirable
to represent all exchange schemes, the dataset is neither
sufficiently large nor geographically representative to
enable such an analysis. Instead, the dataset is
disaggregated into four regions: border, midlands and
western (BMW), the south-west (SW), the east and the
south.7 Each of the four regions has unique character-
istics regarding dairy production. While the south and
the south-west are mainly dairy production regions on
good soils, the BMW region is characterized by lower
stocking density based on poorer soils and higher
rainfall areas.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the four
regions. For comparative purposes direct costs, gross
and net margins are presented in a per litre figure. Direct
costs represent the dairy production costs, such as
feeding stuffs, fertilisers and veterinarian costs. Gross
margins are defined as gross output minus direct costs,
with gross output being total milk sales less purchased
livestock. Net margins are calculated as gross margins
minus overhead costs of production and include for
example depreciation of machinery, buildings and land.
With a total quota size of 1,382 million litres, over a
third of the national quota is located in the south region.
Farms in the BMW region are characterized by smaller
herds and smaller milk quota sizes per farm in
comparison to the remaining regions.
On a gross margin basis, the east region has the
highest profitability, with a gross margin of 17.3 cent
per litre; however when overhead costs are factored in
and net margin is considered the south-west is the most
profitable region with an average net margin of 7.4 cent
per litre. The east has the largest expansion capacity on
existing resources with the average farm having capacity
for 24 additional cows. The expansion capacity is based
on the assumption that half of the cattle herd is replaced
by dairy cows, while also considering replacement of the
current dairy herd.
In terms of milk prices, it is evident from Table 1 that
farmers receive different milk prices in Ireland8. This is
due to different prices paid by the various co-operatives.
For example, farmers in the south region generally
receive higher milk prices than farmers in the remaining
regions. Further, farmers in the BMW region get paid
less for their milk than farmers in the south-west and
east region.
Figure 2 presents the milk price projections under a
baseline policy scenario; this assumes that milk quotas
remain in place and binding until 2015. Data for 2006 to
2010 are actual average national farm level milk prices
(Donnellan and Hennessy, 2011). Prices from 2010 to
2014 are projections produced by Binfield et al. (2008)
using the FAPRI-Ireland model.
5. Results
Development of Quota Prices
Before presenting the estimates of the economic value of
milk quota, the development of milk quota exchange
prices is explored. Individual data on quota trade prices
are available for main co-operatives, see Table 2. For
the purposes of this analysis the co-operatives are
grouped into four regions as described in section 4.
The average quota price for each region is calculated as
the quota price weighted by the volume of milk sold in
each co-operative.
As is evident from Table 2, there is a large variation
of market quota clearing prices between the regions. For
example, in the fourth exchange market quota clearing
prices ranged from 17 cent per litre in the BMW region
to 41 cent per litre in the south region. Further, there is a
noticeable tendency toward decreasing quota prices over
time, which is explained by the approach of the
abolition of milk quotas. The development of the
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various prices is depicted in Figure 3. This figure
presents the average market quota clearing price for
each region and the national average milk price that
prevailed at the time of each milk quota exchange.9
The milk quota prices follow the development of milk
prices quite closely, although to a lesser extent in the
BMW region. Overall, quota prices peaked at the fourth
exchange which took place at the beginning of 2008. In
2007, the national average farm level milk price was
over 30 cent per litre and remained at this level in early
2008. However, a significant drop in milk prices
occurred in the latter half of 2008 and milk prices
decreased to an average of 20.9 cent per litre in 2009. As
can be seen, quota prices collapsed in the fifth exchange,
autumn 2008, following the milk price decline.
Economic Value of Milk Quota
Figures 4a and b present the estimated milk quota
supply and demand curves for trade occurring at the end
of 2007 for the four regional quota markets, i.e. 2008 is
the first year the quota provides a return and seven years
of return are produced from 2008 to 2014 inclusive.
These figures are derived from the previously explained
optimization model (see section 3) and show the
estimated overall quantity traded in the region (x-axis,
volume litres) and the estimated milk quota price (y-
axis). The intersection of the estimated demand and
supply curve is interpreted as the economic value of milk
quota for the specific region.
The results show that the estimated equilibrium
economic value for milk quota in the BMW region is
approximately 21 cent per litre compared to a milk
quota price of 26 cent per litre in the east. The results
from the optimization model also show that the markets
in the south-west and south have a higher quantity of
milk quota traded and the equilibrium values are also
estimated to be higher. Our model predicts the highest
milk quota equilibrium price in the south-west region
with 35 cent per litre. The corresponding milk quota
equilibrium price in the south is 29 cent per litre.
The variation in the estimated economic values of
quota in the different regions is driven by the profit-
ability of milk production in the region and the farm
structure. More specifically, the supply price for milk
quota is derived from net margins, which implies that
farmers in regions with more profitable milk production
are also looking for higher prices when intending to sell
milk quota. Clearly, profitability of milk production is
highly dependent on milk prices. The milk quota market
is also influenced by the expansion capacity of farms,
which indicates that farmers with lower expansion costs
are also able to offer higher prices for additional quota.
Further, the quantities demanded and supplied in the
different regions also impact on the estimated economic
values of milk quota.
In line with the actual milk quota exchange prices (see
Table 2), our optimization model results also show
considerable variation between the regions. The south-
west region, for example, has the highest equilibrium
price with 35 cents per litre (see Figure 4b), which is
driven by the highest net margins of the four regions
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Table 1: Regional Variability – Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics BMW N565
South-West
N576 East N580 South N5122
Weighted population 4,893 5,961 2,796 5,949
Percentage of national quota (%) 22 29 15 34
Total Quota (millions of litres) 894 1,175 610 1,382
Quota size (litres) 182,000 197,000 218,000 232,000
Deliveries per cow (litres) 4,740 4,330 4,570 4,700
Number of dairy cows 35.4 44.0 45.7 46.4
Milk price received (J) 0.261 0.263 0.263 0.265
Direct cost per litre (J) 0.112 0.102 0.102 0.110
Gross margin per litre (J) 0.169 0.166 0.173 0.156
Net margin per litre (J) 0.062 0.074 0.068 0.061
Expansion capacity (cow numbers) 11 15 24 16
Source: National Farm Survey (2007)
Figure 2: FAPRI-Ireland Farm-Level Milk Price Projections for Ireland
9 The three months average milk price preceding the quota exchange scheme is used.
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and, in addition, almost 30% of milk quota is located in
this region (see Table 1). The south region, with an
economic value for milk quota of 29 cent per litre, has
the second highest value for milk quota (see Figure 4b),
which is explained by the fact that this relatively small
region holds over a third of the national quota. Further,
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Table 2: Milk Quota Exchange Clearing Prices for Selected Co-operatives
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Exchange 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
Closing date for bids 10/06 01/07 10/07 01/08 10/08 01/09 10/09
Co-operative
Border, midlands and western
Arrabawn 14 16 24 29 21 13 0
Connacht Gold 12 10 12 14 13 10 5
Donegal 13 12 13 14 10 0 7
Lakelands 11 11 13 14 14 10 5
Town of Monaghan 15 16 20 20 14 10 0
Average price 13 14 15 17 16 11 5
East
Wexford 23 28 29 36 37 10 11
Glanbia 20 21 31 37 32 18 12
Average price 20 21 31 37 32 17 12
South-west
Kerry 17 16 20 27 20 11 5
Dairygold 23 26 45 45 40 16 12
Tipperary 18 18 25 30 29 25 16
Average price 20 21 28 38 30 15 10
South
Dairygold 23 26 45 45 40 16 12
Glanbia 20 21 31 37 32 18 12
Bandon 22 24 36 42 0 24 17
North Cork 19 20 30 29 19 0 0
Average price 22 23 37 41 35 17 12
All prices are milk quota prices expressed in cent per litre.
Source: Irish Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Figure 3: Development of Prices by Region
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milk prices received in this region are higher than in the
remaining regions. In the east region (see Figure 4a), the
estimated economic value of milk quota of 26 cent per
litre is explained by the high expansion capacity (see
Table 1). A high expansion capacity implies that farms
can expand dairy farming at low costs, meaning that
these farmers are able to pay more for additional quota
due to lower expansion costs, i.e. a large number of male
cattle that can be disposed and replaced with cows.
Finally, the BMW region has the lowest estimated value
of milk quota with 21 cent per litre (see Figure 4a),
which is in line with the lowest milk price received and
the highest direct costs in comparison to the remaining
regions (see Table 1).
By comparing the estimates of economic value to the
actual quota exchange prices recorded in the respective
milk quota exchanges, some interesting findings emerge.
Table 3 presents a comparison between the estimated
economic value of milk quota and the average milk
quota exchange price in each region for the end of 2007.
Based on our estimations of the economic value,
farmers could afford to pay more for quota in the BMW
and south-west region, suggesting that quota is under-
valued in those regions. The average exchange price
exceeds the estimated economic value of quota in the
east and south of the country, indicating that quota is
overvalued in those regions.
Close inspection of Table 3, reveals significant
differences between the regions. For example, farmers
in the BMW and the south-west region could afford to
pay more for milk quota (based on the estimated
economic value of milk quota) than the milk quota
exchange price. This indicates that it could be profitable
for farmers to acquire additional milk quota while the
quota scheme is still in place when intending to expand
milk production in the future. In contrast, our estima-
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Figure 4a: Regional Milk Quota Market – BMW and East Region
Figure 4b: Regional Milk Quota Market – South-west and South Region
Table 3: Regional Economic Value of Milk Quota and Average
Milk Quota Exchange Price per Region
Region
Economic
value 2007
3rd Exchange
price Difference
Cent per litre
BMW 21 14 +7
East 26 31 25
South-west 35 28 +7
South 29 37 28
The respective co-operatives for each region are shown in
Table 2.
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tions also reveal that farmers in the remaining two
regions overpay for quota. This is most significant for
the south region, where farmers pay eight cents per litre
more for additional quota than they could afford to pay
based on our model estimations. Given the high milk
quota exchange prices, farmers in these regions would
be better off waiting to expand production until milk
quotas are abolished or quota prices drop.
6. Conclusions
This paper presented a review of the development of
milk quota exchange prices in Ireland and showed
regional estimations of economic values of milk quota.
By comparing actual milk quota exchange prices to the
estimated economic values of milk quota, improved
insight into the functioning of the milk quota market in
Ireland is gained. The results allow suggestions as to
where milk production is likely to move after milk quota
expires and the results can also assist farmers in the
decision whether and when to invest in additional milk
quota. This is of particular relevance since the abolition
of milk quotas in 2015 in the EU brings significant
changes for dairy farmers, most importantly the
possibility to expand production without restrictions.
This study showed that there has been a large variation
in milk quota exchange prices between regions and also
over the years. While the variation of milk quota prices
over the years mainly followed fluctuations in milk prices,
differences between the regions can partly be explained by
profitability and characteristics of milk production in the
particular region. Indeed, the results of our optimization
model confirm this finding and consequently the esti-
mated economic values for milk quota in the four regions
differ considerably. For example, the estimated economic
values of milk quota vary from 35 cent per litre in the
south-west region to 21 cent per litre in the BMW region,
which mirror the different levels of profitability and costs
of production in those regions. When comparing the
estimated economic values of milk quota to the actual
milk quota exchange prices, differences between the
regions are even more pronounced. More specifically,
we find that farmers in the south and east regions overpay
for quota, while farmers in the BMW region and south-
west regions secure good value when investing in
additional milk quota. Based on our model findings,
farmers in the south and east region would be advised to
postpone milk quota investment until prices drop or
quotas are abolished. In contrast, farmers in the BMW
and south-west region secure good value for additional
milk quota and could thus afford to invest in additional
quota while the scheme is still in place.
The high milk quota exchange price in the south
region indicates strong demand for milk quota, which
could be an indicator that farmers are eager to expand
milk production in this region. Further, high milk quota
exchange prices in the east in combination with high
estimated expansion capacity, could also be a sign of
potential expansion of milk production in this region.
Further, evidence from co-operative supplier numbers
suggests that farm-level structural change differed in
Ireland. Structural change has been more rapid in the
border and west of Ireland whereas it has been more
sluggish in the south and east over the past decade. This
may imply that farmers wishing to expand in the south
and east regions have pent-up demand. Indeed, anec-
dotal evidence indicates that farmers in these regions are
eager to get additional quota (Hennessy et al., 2009).
Overall, the findings of this study indicate the
presence of a wedge between milk quota value, i.e.
estimated economic value, and its traded price.
Interestingly, the analysis also revealed that the differ-
ence between the economic value of quota and the milk
quota exchange price is not in the same direction for all
regions. Thus, the imposition of a regional restriction on
milk quota trade is controversial because it inevitably
leads to different trade prices in different regions. While
these regional differences may be partly explained by the
economics of production, other factors such as the
influence of short-term market development and farm-
ers’ behaviour also seem to play an important role.
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Appendix A: Details of Adjustment Costs
The first stage of expansion up to the threshold level Xi involves
increasing cow numbers by disposing of non-dairy livestock (ND)
– typically beef cattle.10 To allow for replacements each non-dairy
livestock unit is equal to one dairy cow less the farm’s herd
replacement rate (RPi). The quantity of extra milk then depends
on the yield record on farm i in period t (Yieldii). Hence, the extent
of this expansion differs with each farmer’s resource base and
technical efficiency; this is expressed as follows:
Xi~0:5NDi(1{RPi)|(Yieldit) (4)
The incremental adjustment cost per litre (Cix) for farm i
associated with this stage of expansion are derived from:
N Replacing a beef livestock unit with dairy results in a net
increase in labour of 23 hours per cow. The cost of extra
labour (Waget) is assumed to be J12 per hour, increasing over
subsequent time periods according to projected wage rate
inflation.
N Infrastructure costs in the first expansion stage (InfraX)
comprise the conversion of existing non-dairy accommodation
(estimated cost of J300 per cow) plus upgrading of dairy
facilities (estimated cost of J406 per cow).
N Infrastructure costs are fully written-down over a 10-year
period on a straight-line basis. The investment is financed
using a 10-year term loan at an interest rate of 6 per cent.
Interest in each year for the amortized loan is computed by
applying the appropriate period compound interest factor
(IntFact) to the sum invested.
N The cost of retaining additional replacement heifers.
N The foregone profit per livestock unit on Non-Dairy livestock
(NDProf), excluding the decoupled payment, is estimated from
NFS data. In 2006, the average profit per beef livestock unit
was J103.
Thus the adjustment cost per litre of quota investment in this stage
would be:
Cix~
23(Waget)z(0:1zIntFact)(InfraX )zNDprofit(1zRPi)
(Yieldit)
(5)
The second stage of expansion which occurs after threshold Xi is
more costly as it involves acquiring additional land and increasing
overall livestock numbers. The costs are as follows:
N Land rental costs are estimated to be J268 per year hectare
(Rent). The additional land required is dependent on the
stocking rate of the farm (SRi).
N Full labour costs are assumed in this expansion stage involving
annual input of 35 hours per cow. The wage rate (Waget) is
J12 per hour in the first time period and increases in
subsequent time periods.
N Infrastructure costs (InfraY) in the second stage involve
expansion of milking facilities and construction of new housing
at a combined cost of J1,633 per additional cow.
N Infrastructure costs are fully written-down over a 20-year
period on a straight-line basis. The investment is financed
using a 20-year term loan at an interest rate of 6 per cent.
Interest in each year for the amortized loan is computed by
applying the appropriate period compound interest factor
(IntFact) to the sum invested.
N Additional cows are purchased for an average price of J1,320
(CowCost) and the interest rate (Intt) on capital invested in the
extra cows is assumed to be 6%.
Therefore, the incremental adjustment cost per litre of quota
investment in this stage can be written as:
Ciy~
Rent=SRi
 
z35(Waget)z(0:1zIntFact)(InfraY )z(1zIntt)(CowCost)
(Yieldit)
:
(6)
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10 As data on land fragmentation is not available, it is assumed that only half of the non-
dairy stock can be replaced with dairy cows.
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